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Abstract—Collaborative spectrum sensing among secondary
users (SUs) in cognitive networks is shown to yield a significant
performance improvement. However, there exists an inherent
trade off between the gains in terms of probability of detection
of the primary user (PU) and the costs in terms of false alarm
probability. In this paper, we study the impact of this trade
off on the topology and the dynamics of an ad hoc network
of SUs seeking to reduce the interference on the PU through
collaborative sensing. Moreover, while existing literature mainly
focused on centralized solutions for collaborative sensing, we pro-
pose distributed collaboration strategies through game theory. We
model the problem as a non-transferable coalitional game, and
propose a distributed algorithm for coalition formation through
simple merge and split rules. Through the proposed algorithm,
SUs can autonomously collaborate and self-organize into disjoint
independent coalitions, while maximizing their detection proba-
bility taking into account the cooperation costs (in terms of false
alarm). We study the stability of the resulting network structure,
and show that a maximum number of SUs per formed coalition
exists for the proposed utility model. Through simulations, we
compare the performance of the proposed distributed solution
with respect to a centralized solution that minimizes the average
missing probability per SU. Simulation results show that the
proposed algorithm allows a reduction of up to 86.54% of the
average missing probability per SU (probability of missing the
detection of the PU) relatively to the non-cooperative case, while
maintaining a certain false alarm level. The results also show
how the proposed algorithm autonomously adapts the network
topology to environmental changes such as mobility.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, there has been an exponential growth
in wireless services, yielding a huge demand on the radio
spectrum. However, the spectrum resources are scarce and
most of them have been already licensed to existing operators.
Governmental agencies such as the Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) in the United States have performed
thorough studies that showed that the actual licensed spectrum
remains unoccupied for large periods of time [1]. In order to
efficiently exploit these spectrum holes, cognitive radio (CR)
has been proposed [2]. By monitoring and adapting to the
environment, CRs (secondary users) can share the spectrum
with the licensed users (primary users), operating whenever
the primary user (PU) is not using the spectrum. Implementing
such flexible CRs faces several challenges. For instance, CRs
must constantly sense the spectrum in order to detect the
presence of the PU and use the spectrum holes without causing
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harmful interference to the PU. Hence, efficient spectrum
sensing constitutes a major challenge in cognitive networks.
For sensing the presence of the PU, the secondary users
(SUs) must be able to detect the signal of the PU. Different
kinds of detectors can be used for spectrum sensing such as
matched filter detectors, energy detectors or cyclostationary
detectors [3]. However, the performance of spectrum sensing
can be significantly affected by the degradation of the PU
signal due to path loss or shadowing (hidden terminal). It
has been shown that, through collaboration among SUs, the
effects of this hidden terminal problem can be reduced and the
probability of detecting the PU can be improved [4–6]. For
instance, in [4] the SUs collaborate by sharing their sensing
decisions through a centralized fusion center in the network.
This centralized entity combines the sensing bits from the
SUs using the OR-rule for data fusion and makes a final PU
detection decision. A similar centralized approach is used in
[5] using different decision-combining methods.The authors
in [6] propose spatial diversity techniques for improving the
performance of collaborative spectrum sensing by combatting
the error probability due to fading on the reporting channel
between the SUs and the central fusion center. Hence, existing
literature mainly focused on the performance assessment of
collaborative spectrum sensing in the presence of a centralized
fusion center. However, in practice, the SUs may belong to
different service providers and they need to interact with
each other for collaboration without relying on a centralized
fusion center. Moreover, a centralized approach can lead to a
significant overhead and an increased complexity.
The main contribution of this paper is to devise distributed
collaboration strategies for SUs in an ad hoc cognitive net-
work. Another major contribution of this work is to study
the impact on the network topology of the inherent trade off
that exists between the collaborative spectrum sensing gains
in terms of detection probability and the cooperation costs
in terms of false alarm probability. This trade off can be
pictured as a trade off between reducing the interference on
the PU (increasing the detection probability) while maintaining
a good spectrum utilization (reducing the false alarm proba-
bility). For distributed collaboration, we model the problem
as a non-transferable coalitional game and we propose a
distributed algorithm for coalition formation based on simple
merge and split rules. Through the proposed algorithm, each
SU autonomously decides to form or break a coalition for
maximizing its utility in terms of detection probability while
accounting for a false alarm cost. We show that, due to the
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cost for cooperation, independent disjoint coalitions will form
in the network. We study the stability of the resulting coalition
structure and show that a maximum coalition size exists for
the proposed utility model. Through simulations, we assess the
performance of the proposed algorithm relatively to the non-
cooperative case, we compare it with a centralized solution and
we show how the proposed algorithm autonomously adapts the
network topology to environmental changes such as mobility.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II
presents the system model. In Section III, we present the
proposed coalitional game and prove different properties while
in Section IV we devise a distributed algorithm for coalition
formation. Simulation results are presented and analyzed in
Section V. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider an ad hoc network consisting of N = {1, . . . , N}
transmit-receive pairs of SUs and a single PU. Since the
focus is on spectrum sensing, we are only interested in the
transmitter part of each of the N SUs. In a non-cooperative
approach, each of the N SUs continuously senses the spectrum
in order to detect the presence of the PU. For detecting the
PU, we use energy detectors which are one of the main
practical signal detectors in cognitive radio networks [4–6].
In such a non-cooperative setting, assuming Rayleigh fading,
the detection probability and the false alarm probability of a
SU i are, respectively, given by [4], [7]
Pd,i = e
−λ
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where m is the time bandwidth product, λ is the energy
detection threshold assumed the same for all SUs without
loss of generality as in [4–6], Γ(., .) is the incomplete gamma
function, Γ(.) is the gamma function and γ¯i is the average
SNR of the received signal from the PU to SU given by
γ¯i,PU =
PP U hP U,i
σ2
with PPU the transmit power of the PU, σ
2
the noise variance and hPU,i = κ/d
µ
PU,i the path loss between
the PU and SU i; κ being the path loss constant, µ the path
loss exponent and dPU,i the distance between the PU and
SU i. It is important to note that the non-cooperative false
alarm probability expression depends solely on the detection
threshold λ and does not depend on the SU’s location; hence
we dropped the subscript i in (2). Finally, an important metric
that we will thoroughly use is the missing probability for a SU
i, which is defined as the probability of missing the detection
of a PU and given by
Pm,i = 1− Pd,i. (3)
For instance, reducing the missing probability directly maps
to reducing the interference on the PU and increasing the
Fig. 1. An illustrative example of coalition formation for collaborative
spectrum sensing among SUs.
probability of detection. In order to minimize their missing
probabilities, the SUs will interact for forming coalitions of
collaborating SUs. Within each coalition S ⊆ N , an SU
selected as coalition head, collects the sensing bits from the
coalition’s SUs and acts as a fusion center in order to make
a coalition-based decision on the presence or absence of the
PU. This can be seen as having the centralized collaborative
sensing of [4], [6] applied at the level of each coalition with
the coalition head being the fusion center to which all the
coalition members report. For combining the sensing bits and
making the final detection decision, the coalition head will
use the decision fusion OR-rule such as in [4], [6]. Within
each coalition we take into account the probability of error
due to the fading on the reporting channel between the SUs
of a coalition and the coalition head [6]. Inside a coalition S,
assuming BPSK modulation in Rayleigh fading environments,
the probability of reporting error between a SU i ∈ S and the
coalition head k ∈ S is given by
Pe,i,k =
1
2
(
1−
√
γ¯i,k
2 + γ¯i,k
)
, (4)
where γ¯i,k =
Pihi,k
σ2
is the average SNR between SU i and the
coalition head k inside coalition S with Pi the transmit power
of SU i, σ2 the gaussian noise and hi,k =
κ
d
µ
i,k
the path loss
between SU i and coalition head k. Any SU can be selected as
a coalition head within a coalition. However, for the remainder
of this paper, we will adopt the following assumption without
loss of generality
Assumption 1: Within a coalition S, the SU k ∈ S having
the lowest non-cooperative missing probability Pm,k is chosen
as coalition head. Hence, the coalition head k of a coalition
S is given by k = arg min
i∈S
Pm,i with Pm,i given by (3).
The driver behind Assumption 1 is that the SU having the
lowest missing probability (best detection probability) within
a coalition should not risk sending his local sensing bit over
the fading reporting channel; and thus it will serve as a fusion
center for the other SUs in the coalition. By collaborative
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sensing, the missing and false alarm probabilities of a coalition
S having coalition head k are, respectively, given by [6]
Qm,S =
∏
i∈S
[Pm,i(1− Pe,i,k) + (1− Pm,i)Pe,i,k], (5)
Qf,S = 1−
∏
i∈S
[(1− Pf )(1− Pe,i,k) + PfPe,i,k], (6)
where Pm,i, Pf and Pe,i,k are respectively given by (3), (2)
and (4) for an SU i ∈ S and coalition head k ∈ S.
It is clear from (5) and (6) that as the number of SUs per
coalition increases, the missing probability will decrease while
the probability of false alarm will increase. This is a crucial
trade off in collaborative spectrum sensing that can have a
major impact on the collaboration strategies of each SU. Thus,
our objective is to derive distributed strategies allowing the
SUs to collaborate while accounting for this trade off. An
example of the sought network structure is shown in Fig.1.
III. COLLABORATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING AS
COALITIONAL GAME
In this section, we model the problem of collaborative
spectrum sensing as a coalitional game and we prove and
discuss its key properties.
A. Centralized Approach
A centralized approach can be used in order to find the
optimal coalition structure that allows the SUs to maximize
their benefit from collaborative spectrum sensing, such as
in Fig.1. For instance, we seek a centralized solution that
minimizes the average missing probability (maximizes the
average detection probability) per SU subject to a false alarm
probability constraint per SU. In a centralized approach, we
assume the existence of a centralized entity in the network
that is able to gather information on the SUs such as their
individual missing probabilities or their location. In brief,
the centralized entity must be able to know all the required
parameters for computing the probabilities in (5) and (6) in
order to find the optimal structure. However, prior to deriving
such an optimal centralized solution, the following property
must be pinpointed within each coalition
Property 1: The missing and false alarm probabilities of
any SU i ∈ S are given by the missing and false alarm
probabilities of the coalition S in (5) and (6) respectively.
Proof: Within each coalition S the SUs report their
sensing bits to the coalition head. In its turn the coalition
head of S combines the sensing bits using decision fusion
and makes a final decision on the presence or absence of the
PU. Thus, SUs belonging to a coalition S will transmit or not
based on the final coalition head decision. Consequently, the
missing and false alarm probabilities of any SU i ∈ S are
the missing and false alarm probabilities of the coalition S to
which i belongs as given by in (5) and (6) respectively.
As a consequence of Property 1 the required false alarm
probability constraint per SU directly maps to a false alarm
probability constraint per coalition. Therefore, denoting B as
the set of all partitions of N , the centralized approach seeks
to solve the following optimization problem
min
P∈B
∑
S∈P |S| ·Qm,S
N
, (7)
s.t. Qf,S ≤ α ∀ S ∈ P,
where |.| represents the cardinality of a set operator and S is a
coalition belonging to the partition P . Clearly, the centralized
optimization problem seeks to find the optimal partition P∗ ∈
B that minimizes the average missing probability per SU,
subject to a false alarm constraint per SU (coalition).
However, it is shown in [8] that finding the optimal coalition
structure for solving an optimization problem such as in (7) is
an NP-complete problem. This is mainly due to the fact that
the number of possible coalition structures (partitions), given
by the Bell number, grows exponentially with the number of
SUs N . Moreover, the complexity increases further due to the
fact that the expressions of Qm,S and Qf,S given by (5) and
(6) depend on the optimization parameter P . For this purpose,
deriving a distributed solution enabling the SUs to benefit
from collaborative spectrum sensing with a low complexity
is desirable. The above formulated centralized approach will
be used as a benchmark for the distributed solution in the
simulations; for reasonably small networks.
B. Game Formulation and Properties
For the purpose of deriving a distributed algorithm that
can minimize the missing probability per SU, we refer to
cooperative game theory [9] which provides a set of analytical
tools suitable for such algorithms. For instance, the proposed
collaborative sensing problem can be modeled as a (N , v)
coalitional game [9] where N is the set of players (the SUs)
and v is the utility function or value of a coalition.
The value v(S) of a coalition S ⊆ N must capture the trade
off between the probability of detection and the probability
of false alarm. For this purpose, v(S) must be an increasing
function of the detection probability Qd,S = 1−Qm,S within
coalition S and a decreasing function of the false alarm
probability Qf,S . A suitable utility function is given by
v(S) = Qd,S − C(Qf,S) = (1−Qm,S)− C(Qf,S), (8)
where Qm,S is the missing probability of coalition S given
by (5) and C(Qf,S) is a cost function of the false alarm
probability within coalition S given by (6).
First of all, we provide the following definition from [9]
and subsequently prove an interesting property pertaining to
the proposed game model.
Definition 1: A coalitional game (N , v) is said to have
a transferable utility if the value v(S) can be arbitrarily
apportioned between the coalition’s players. Otherwise, the
coalitional game has a non-transferable utility and each player
will have its own utility within coalition S.
Property 2: In the proposed collaborative sensing game,
the utility of a coalition S is equal to the utility of each SU
in the coalition, i.e. v(S) = φi(S) ∀ i ∈ S where φi(S)
denotes the utility of SU i when i belongs to a coalition S.
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Consequently, the proposed (N , v) coalitional game model has
a non-transferable utility.
Proof: The value of a coalition in the proposed game is
given by (8) and is a function of Qm,S and Qf,S . As shown
in Property 1, the missing probabilities for each SU i in S are
also given by Qm,S and Qf,S and thus the payoff of each SU
i ∈ S is given by φi(S) = v(S). Consequently, the value of
a coalition v(S) cannot be arbitrarily apportioned among the
users of a coalition; and the proposed coalitional game has
non-transferable utility.
In general, coalitional game based problems seek to char-
acterize the properties and stability of the grand coalition
of all players since it is generally assumed that the grand
coalition maximizes the utilities of the players [9]. In our
case, although collaborative spectrum sensing improves the
detection probability for the SUs; the cost in terms of false
alarm limits this gain. Therefore, for the proposed (N , v)
coalitional game we have
Property 3: For the proposed (N , v) coalitional game, the
grand coalition of all the SUs does not always form due to the
collaboration false alarm costs; and thus disjoint independent
coalitions will form in the network.
Proof: By inspecting Qm,S in (5) and through the results
shown in [4], [6] it is clear that as the number of SUs in
a coalition increase Qm,S decreases and the performance in
terms of detection probability improves. Hence, when no cost
for collaboration exists, the grand coalition of all SUs is the
optimal structure for maximizing the detection probability.
However, when the number of SUs in a coalition S increases, it
is shown in [4], [6] through (5) that the false alarm probability
increases. Therefore, for the proposed collaborative spectrum
sensing model with cost for collaboration, the grand coalition
of all SUs will, in general, not form due to the false alarm
cost as taken into consideration in (8).
In a nutshell, we have a non-transferable (N , v) coalitional
game where the grand coalition of does not form. Before
deriving a distributed algorithm for forming coalitions among
SUs, we will delve into the details of the cost function in (8).
C. Cost Function
Any well designed cost function C(Qf,S) in (8) must satisfy
several requirements needed for adequately modeling the false
alarm cost. On one hand, C(Qf,S) must be an increasing
function of Qf,S with the increase slope becoming steeper as
Qf,S increases. On the other hand, the cost function C(Qf,S)
must impose a maximum tolerable false alarm probability, i.e.
an upper bound constraint on the false alarm, that cannot be
exceeded by any SU in a manner similar to the centralized
problem in (7) (due to Property 1, imposing a false alarm
constraint on the coalition maps to a constraint per SU).
A well suited cost function satisfying the above require-
ments is the logarithmic barrier penalty function given by [10]
C(Qf,S) =
{
−α2 · log (1− (
Qf,S
α
)2), if Qf,S < α,
+∞, if Qf,S ≥ α,
(9)
where α is a false alarm constraint per coalition (i.e. per
SU). The cost function in (9) allows to incur a penalty
which is increasing with the false alarm probability. Moreover,
it imposes a maximum false alarm probability per SU. In
addition, as the false alarm probability gets closer to α the
cost for collaboration increases steeply, requiring a significant
improvement in detection probability if the SUs wish to
collaborate as per (8). Also, it is interesting to note that
the proposed cost function depends on both distance and
the number of SUs in the coalition, through the false alarm
probability Qf,S (the distance lies within the probability of
error). Hence, the cost for collaboration increases with the
number of SUs in the coalition as well as when the distance
between the coalition’s SUs increases.
IV. DISTRIBUTED COALITION FORMATION ALGORITHM
In this section, we propose a distributed coalition formation
algorithm and we discuss its key properties.
A. Coalition Formation Concepts
Coalition formation has been a topic of high interest in game
theory [8], [11–14]. The goal is to find algorithms for charac-
terizing the coalitional structures that form in a network where
the grand coalition is not optimal. For instance, a generic
framework for coalition formation is presented in [13–15]
whereby coalitions form and break through two simple merge-
and-split rules. This framework can be used to construct
a distributed coalition formation algorithm for collaborative
sensing, but first, we define the following concepts [13], [14].
Definition 2: A collection of coalitions, denoted S, is
defined as the set S = {S1, . . . , Sl} of mutually disjoint
coalitions Si ⊂ N . If the collection spans all the players of
N ; that is
⋃l
j=1 Sj = N , the collection is a partition of N .
Definition 3: A preference operator or comparison relation
⊲ is defined for comparing two collections R = {R1, . . . , Rl}
and S = {S1, . . . , Sm} that are partitions of the same subset
A ⊆ N (i.e. same players in R and S). Thus, R⊲ S implies
that the wayR partitions A is preferred to the way S partitions
A based on a criterion to be defined next.
Various criteria (referred to as orders) can be used as
comparison relations between collections or partitions [13],
[14]. These orders are divided into two main categories:
coalition value orders and individual value orders. Coalition
value orders compare two collections (or partitions) using
the value of the coalitions inside these collections such as
in the utilitarian order where R ⊲ S implies
∑l
i=1 v(Ri) >∑p
i=1 v(Si). Individual value orders perform the comparison
using the actual player utilities and not the coalition value.
For such orders, two collections R and S are seen as sets
of player utilities of the same length L (number of players).
The players’ utilities are either the payoffs after division
of the value of the coalitions in a collection (transferable
utility) or the actual utilities of the players belonging to the
coalitions in a collection (non-transferable utility). Due to the
non-transferable nature of the proposed (N , v) collaborative
sensing game (Property 2), an individual value order must
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be used as a comparison relation ⊲. An important example
of individual value orders is the Pareto order. Denote for a
collection R = {R1, . . . , Rl}, the utility of a player j in
a coalition Ri ∈ R by φj(R) = φj(Rj) = v(Rj) (as per
Property 2); hence, the Pareto order is defined as follows
R⊲ S ⇐⇒ {φj(R) ≥ φj(S) ∀ j ∈ R,S}
with at least one strict inequality (>) for a player k. (10)
Due to the non-transferable nature of the proposed collabora-
tive sensing model, the Pareto order is an adequate preference
relation. Having defined the various concepts, we construct a
distributed coalition formation algorithm in the next section.
B. Coalition Formation Algorithm
For autonomous coalition formation in cognitive radio net-
works, we propose a distributed algorithm based on two simple
rules denoted as “merge” and “split” that allow to modify a
partition T of the SUs set N as follows [13]
Definition 4: Merge Rule - Merge any set of coalitions
{S1, . . . , Sl} where {
⋃l
j=1 Sj} ⊲ {S1, . . . , Sl}, therefore,
{S1, . . . , Sl} → {
⋃l
j=1 Sj}. (each Si is a coalition in T ).
Definition 5: Split Rule - Split any coalition
⋃l
j=1 Sj
where {S1, . . . , Sl} ⊲ {
⋃l
j=1 Sj}, thus, {
⋃l
j=1 Sj} →
{S1, . . . , Sl}. (each Si is a coalition in T ).
Using the above rules, multiple coalitions can merge into a
larger coalition if merging yields a preferred collection based
on the selected order ⊲. Similarly, a coalition would split
into smaller coalitions if splitting yields a preferred collection.
When ⊲ is the Pareto order, coalitions will merge (split) only if
at least one SU is able to strictly improve its individual utility
through this merge (split) without decreasing the other SUs’
utilities. By using the merge-and-split rules combined with
the Pareto order, a distributed coalition formation algorithm
suited for collaborative spectrum sensing can be constructed.
First and foremost, the appeal of forming coalitions using
merge-and-split stems from the fact that it has been shown
in [13] and [14] that any arbitrary iteration of merge-and-split
operations terminates. Moreover, each merge or split decision
can be taken in a distributed manner by each individual SU or
by each already formed coalition. Subsequently, a merge-and-
split coalition algorithm can adequately model the distributed
interactions among the SUs of a cognitive network that are
seeking to collaborate in the sensing process.
In consequence, for the proposed collaborative sensing
game, we construct a coalition formation algorithm based on
merge-and-split and divided into three phases: local sensing,
adaptive coalition formation and coalition sensing. In the local
sensing phase, each individual SU computes its own local PU
detection bit; based on the received PU signal. In the adaptive
coalition formation phase, the SUs (or existing coalitions of
SUs) interact in order to assess whether to share their sensing
results with nearby coalitions. For this purpose, an iteration
of sequential merge-and-split rules occurs in the network,
whereby each coalition decides to merge (or split) depending
on the utility improvement that merging (or splitting) yields.
In this phase, as time evolves and SUs (or the PU) move, the
SUs can autonomously self-organize and adapt the network’s
topology through new merge-and-split iterations with each
coalition taking the decision to merge (or split) subject to
satisfying the merge (or split) rule through Pareto order (10).
In the final coalition sensing phase, once the network topology
converges following merge-and-split, SUs that belong to the
same coalition report their local sensing bits to their coalition
head. The coalition head subsequently uses decision fusion
OR-rule to make a final decision on the presence or the
absence of the PU. This decision is then reported by the
coalition heads to all the SUs within their respective coalitions.
Each round of the 3 phases of the proposed algorithm starts
from an initial network partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of N .
During the adaptive coalition formation phase any random
coalition (individual SU) can start with the merge process.
For implementation purposes, assume that the coalition Ti ∈ T
which has the highest utility in the initial partition T starts the
merge by attempting to collaborate with a nearby coalition. On
one hand, if merging occurs, a new coalition T˜i is formed and,
in its turn, coalition T˜i will attempt to merge with a nearby
SU that can improve its utility. On the other hand, if Ti is
unable to merge with the firstly discovered partner, it tries to
find other coalitions that have a mutual benefit in merging. The
search ends by a final merged coalition T finali composed of Ti
and one or several of coalitions in its vicinity (T finali = Ti,
if no merge occurred). The algorithm is repeated for the
remaining Ti ∈ T until all the coalitions have made their
merge decisions, resulting in a final partition F . Following the
merge process, the coalitions in the resulting partition F are
next subject to split operations, if any is possible. An iteration
consisting of multiple successive merge-and-split operations is
repeated until it terminates. It must stressed that the decisions
to merge or split can be taken in a distributed way without
relying on any centralized entity as each SU or coalition can
make its own decision for merging or splitting. Table I shows
a summary of one round of the proposed algorithm.
For the proposed merge-and-split algorithm, an upper bound
on the maximum coalition size is imposed by the proposed
utility and cost models in (8) and (9) as follows
Theorem 1: For the proposed collaborative sensing model,
any coalition structure resulting from the distributed coalition
formation algorithm will have coalitions limited in size to a
maximum of Mmax =
log (1−α)
log (1−Pf )
SUs.
Proof: For forming coalitions, the proposed algorithm
requires an improvement in the utility of the SUs through
Pareto order. However, the benefit from collaboration is limited
by the false alarm probability cost modeled by the barrier
function (9). A minimum false alarm cost in a coalition S with
coalition head k ∈ S exists whenever the reporting channel is
perfect, i.e., exhibiting no error, hence Pe,i,k = 0 ∀i ∈ S.
In this perfect case, the false alarm probability in a perfect
coalition Sp is given by
Qf,Sp = 1−
∏
i∈Sp
(1− Pf ) = 1− (1− Pf )
|Sp|, (11)
6TABLE I
ONE ROUND OF THE PROPOSED COLLABORATIVE SENSING ALGORITHM
Initial State
The network is partitioned by T = {T1, . . . , Tk} (At the beginning
of all time T = N = {1, . . . , N} with non-cooperative SUs).
Three phases in each round of the coalition formation algorithm
Phase 1 - Local Sensing:
Each individual SU computes its local PU signal sensing bit.
Phase 2 - Adaptive coalition formation:
In this phase, coalition formation using merge-and-split occurs.
repeat
a) F = Merge(T ); coalitions in T decide to merge
based on the merge algorithm explained in Section IV-B.
b) T = Split(F ); coalitions in F decide to split based on
the Pareto order.
until merge-and-split terminates.
Phase 3 - Coalition Sensing:
a) Each SU reports its sensing bit to the coalition head.
b) The coalition head of each coalition makes a final decision on
the absence or presence of he PU using decision fusion OR-rule.
c) The SUs in a coalition abide by the final decision made by the
coalition head.
The above phases are repeated throughout the network operation.
In Phase 2, through distributed merge-and-split decisions, the SUs
can autonomously adapt the network topology to environmental
changes such as mobility.
where |Sp| is the number of SUs in the perfect coalition Sp.
A perfect coalition Sp where the reporting channels inside are
perfect (i.e. SUs are grouped very close to each other) can
accommodate the largest number of SUs relatively to other
coalitions. Hence, we can use this perfect coalition to find an
upper bound on the maximum number of SUs per coalition.
For instance, the log barrier function in (9) tends to infinity
whenever the false alarm probability constraint per coalition
is reached which implies an upper bound on the maximum
number of SUs per coalition if Qf,Sp ≥ α, yielding by (11)
|Sp| ≤
log (1− α)
log (1− Pf )
= Mmax . (12)
It is interesting to note that the maximum size of a coalition
Mmax depends mainly on two parameters: the false alarm
constraint α and the non-cooperative false alarm Pf . For
instance, larger false alarm constraints allow larger coalitions,
as the maximum tolerable cost limit for collaboration is
increased. Moreover, as the non-cooperative false alarm Pf
decreases, the possibilities for collaboration are larger since
the increase of the false alarm due to coalition size becomes
smaller as per (6). It must be noted that the dependence of
Mmax on Pf yields a direct dependence of Mmax on the
energy detection threshold λ as per (2). Finally, it is interesting
to see that the upper bound on the coalition size does not
depend on the location of the SUs in the network nor on the
actual number of SUs in the network. Hence, having more
SUs in the network for a fixed α and Pf does not increase the
upper bound on coalition size.
C. Stability
The result of the proposed algorithm in Table I is a
network partition composed of disjoint independent coalitions
of SUs. The stability of this resulting network structure can be
investigated using the concept of a defection function D [13].
Definition 6: A defection function D is a function which
associates with each partition T of N a group of collections
in N . A partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of N is D-stable if no
group of players is interested in leaving T when the players
who leave can only form the collections allowed by D.
Two important defection functions must be characterized
[13–15]. First, the Dhp(T ) function (denoted Dhp) which
associates with each partition T of N the group of all
partitions of N that the players can form through merge-
and-split operations applied to T . This function allows any
group of players to leave the partition T of N through merge-
and-split operations to create another partition in N . Second,
the Dc(T ) function (denoted Dc) which associates with each
partition T of N the family of all collections in N . This
function allows any group of players to leave the partition T
of N through any operation and create an arbitrary collection
in N . Two forms of stability stem from these definitions: Dhp
stability and a stronger Dc stability. A partition T is Dhp-
stable, if no players in T are interested in leaving T through
merge-and-split to form other partitions in N ; while a partition
T is Dc-stable, if no players in T are interested in leaving T
through any operation (not necessary merge or split) to form
other collections in N .
Characterizing any type of D-stability for a partition de-
pends on various properties of its coalitions. For instance, a
partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} is Dhp-stable, if the following two
necessary and sufficient conditions are met [15], [13] (⋫ is
the non-preference operator)
1) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , m} and for each partition
{R1, . . . , Rm} of Ti ∈ T we have {R1, . . . , Rm} ⋫ Ti;
2) For each S ⊆ {1, . . . , l} we have
⋃
i∈S Ti ⋫ {Ti|i ∈ S},
Theorem 2: Every partition resulting from our proposed
coalition formation algorithm is Dhp-stable.
Proof: Assume T = {T1, . . . , Tl} is the partition result-
ing from our algorithm in Table I. If for any i ∈ {1, . . . , l}
and for any partition {R1, . . . , Rm} of Ti ∈ T we assume that
{R1, . . . , Rm}⊲ Ti then the partition T can still be modified
by applying a split rule on Ti contradicting with the fact that
T resulted from a termination of the merge-and-split iteration;
therefore {S1, . . . , Sm} ⋫ Ti (first Dhp stability condition
verified). A similar reasoning is applicable in order to prove
that T verifies the second condition; since otherwise a merge
rule would still be applicable.
With regards to Dc stability, the work in [13–15] proved that
a Dc-stable partition has the following properties:
1) If it exists, a Dc-stable partition is the unique outcome
of any arbitrary iteration of merge-and-split and is a
Dhp-stable partition.
2) A Dc-stable partition T is a unique ⊲-maximal partition,
that is for all partitions T ′ 6= T ofN , T ⊲T ′. In the case
where ⊲ represents the Pareto order, this implies that
the Dc-stable partition T is the partition that presents a
Pareto optimal utility distribution for all the players.
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Fig. 2. Average missing probabilities (average over locations of SUs and non-
cooperative false alarm range Pf ∈]0, α[ ) vs. number of SUs.
However, the existence of a Dc-stable partition is not always
guaranteed [13]. The Dc-stable partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} of
the whole space N exists if a partition of N that verifies the
following two necessary and sufficient conditions exists [13]:
1) For each i ∈ {1, . . . , l} and each pair of disjoint
coalitions S1 and S2 such that {S1 ∪S2} ⊆ Ti we have
{S1 ∪ S2}⊲ {S1, S2}.
2) For the partition T = {T1, . . . , Tl} a coalition G ⊂
N formed of players belonging to different Ti ∈ T
is T -incompatible if for no i ∈ {1, . . . , l} we have
G ⊂ Ti. Dc-stability requires that for all T -incompatible
coalitions {G}[T ]⊲{G} where {G}[T ] = {G∩Ti ∀ i ∈
{1, . . . , l}} is the projection of coalition G on T .
If no partition of N can satisfy these conditions, then no Dc-
stable partitions of N exists. Nevertheless, we have
Lemma 1: For the proposed (N , v) collaborative sensing
coalitional game, the proposed algorithm of Table I converges
to the optimal Dc-stable partition, if such a partition exists.
Otherwise, the proposed algorithm yields a final network
partition that is Dhp-stable.
Proof: The proof is an immediate consequence of The-
orem 2 and the fact that the Dc-stable partition is a unique
outcome of any arbitrary merge-and-split iteration which is
the case with any partition resulting from our algorithm.
Moreover, for the proposed game, the existence of the Dc-
stable partition cannot be always guaranteed. For instance,
for verifying the first condition for existence of the Dc-stable
partition, the SUs belonging to partitions of each coalitions
must verify the Pareto order through their utility given by
(8). Similarly, for verifying the second condition of Dc sta-
bility, SUs belonging to all T -incompatible coalitions in the
network must verify the Pareto order. Consequently, finding a
geometrical closed-form condition for the existence of such a
partition is not feasible as it depends on the location of the
SUs and the PU through the individual missing and false alarm
probabilities in the utility expression (8). Hence, the existence
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non-cooperative false alarm range Pf ∈]0, α[ ) vs. number of SUs.
of the Dc-stable partition is closely tied to the location of the
SUs and the PU which both can be random parameters in
practical networks. However, the proposed algorithm will al-
ways guarantee convergence to this optimal Dc-stable partition
when it exists as stated in Lemma 1. Whenever a Dc-stable
partition does not exist, the coalition structure resulting from
the proposed algorithm will be Dhp-stable (no coalition or SU
is able to merge or split any further).
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
For simulations, the following network is set up: The PU is
placed at the origin of a square of 3 km ×3 km with the SUs
randomly deployed around the PU. We set the time bandwidth
product m = 5 [4–6], the PU transmit power PPU = 100 mW,
the SU transmit power Pi = 10 mW ∀i ∈ N and the noise
level σ2 = −90 dBm. For path loss, we set µ = 3 and κ = 1.
The maximum constraint on the false alarm is taken as α = 0.1
as recommended by the IEEE 802.22 standard [16].
In Figures 2 and 3 we show, respectively, the average
missing probabilities and the average false alarm probabilities
achieved per SU for different network sizes. These probabili-
ties are averaged over random locations of the SUs as well as a
range of energy detection thresholds λ that does not violate the
false alarm constraint; which in turn, maps into an average over
the non-cooperative false alarm range Pf ∈]0, α[ (obviously,
for Pf > α no cooperation is possible). In Fig. 2, we show that
the proposed algorithm yields a significant improvement in the
average missing probability reaching up to 86.54% reduction
(at N = 30) compared to the non-cooperative case. This
advantage is increasing with the network size N . However,
there exists a gap in the performance of the proposed algorithm
and that of the optimal centralized solution. This gap stems
mainly from the fact that the log barrier function used in
the distributed algorithm (9) increases the cost drastically
when the false alarm probability is in the vicinity of α. This
increased cost makes it harder for coalitions with false alarm
levels close to α to collaborate in the distributed approach
as they require a large missing probability improvement to
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Pf (or energy detection threshold λ).
compensate the cost in their utility (8) so that a Pareto order
merge or split becomes possible. However, albeit the proposed
cost function yields a performance gap in terms of missing
probability, it forces a false alarm for the distributed case
smaller than that of the centralized solution as seen in Fig. 3.
Moreover, Fig. 3 shows that the achieved average false
alarm by the proposed distributed solution outperforms that of
the centralized solution but is still outperformed by the non-
cooperative case. Thus, while the centralized solution achieves
a better missing probability; the proposed distributed algo-
rithm compensates this performance gap through the average
achieved false alarm. In summary, Fig. 2 and Fig. 3 clearly
show the performance trade off that exists between the gains
achieved by collaborative spectrum sensing in terms of average
missing probability and the corresponding cost in terms of
average false alarm probability.
In Fig. 4 we show the average missing probabilities per
SU for different energy detection thresholds λ expressed by
the feasible range of non-cooperative false alarm probabilities
Pf ∈]0, α[ for N = 7. In this figure, we show that as
the non-cooperative Pf decreases the performance advantage
of collaborative spectrum sensing for both the centralized
and distributed solutions increases (except for very small Pf
where the advantage in terms of missing probability reaches
its maximum). The performance gap between centralized
and distributed is once again compensated by a false alarm
advantage for the distributed solution as already seen and
explained in Fig. 3 for N = 7. Finally, in this figure, it must
be noted that as Pf approaches α = 0.1 the advantage for
collaborative spectrum sensing diminishes drastically as the
network converges towards the non-cooperative case.
In Fig. 5 we show a snapshot of the network structure
resulting from the proposed distributed algorithm (dashed blue
line) as well as the centralized approach (solid red line) for
N = 7 randomly placed SUs and a non-cooperative false
alarm Pf = 0.01. We notice that the structures resulting
from both approaches are almost comparable; with nearby SUs
−1.5 −1 −0.5 0 0.5 1 1.5
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
1.5
Primary User
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Position in x (km)
Po
si
tio
n 
in
 y
 (k
m)
 
 
Fig. 5. Final coalition structure from both distributed (dashed blue line) and
centralized (solid red line) collaborative spectrum sensing for a network of
N = 7 SUs.
forming collaborative coalitions for improving their missing
probabilities. However, for the distributed solution, SU 4 is
part of coalition S1 = {1, 2, 4, 6} while for the centralized
approach SU 4 is part of coalition {3, 4, 5}. This difference in
the network structure is due to the fact that, in the distributed
case, SU 4 acts selfishly while aiming at improving its own
utility. In fact, by merging with {3, 5} SU 4 achieves a utility
of φ4({3, 5}) = 0.9859 with a missing probability of 0.0024
whereas by merging with {1, 2, 6} SU 4 achieves a utility
of φ4({1, 2, 4, 6}) = 0.9957 with a missing probability of
0.00099. Thus, when acting autonomously in a distributed
manner, SU 4 prefers to merge with {1, 2, 6} rather than with
{3, 5} regardless of the optimal structure for the network as a
whole. In brief, Fig. 5 shows how the cognitive network struc-
tures itself for both centralized and distributed approaches.
Furthermore, in Fig. 6 we show how our distributed algo-
rithm in Table I handles mobility during Phase 2 (adaptive
coalition formation). For this purpose, after the network struc-
ture in Fig. 5 has formed, we allow SU 1 to move horizontally
along the positive x-axis while other SUs are immobile. In
Fig. 6, at the beginning, the utilities of SUs {1, 2, 4, 6} are
similar since they belong to the same coalition. These utilities
decrease as SU 1 distances itself from {2, 4, 6}. After moving
0.8 km SUs {1, 6} split from coalition {1, 2, 4, 6} by Pareto
order as φ1({1, 6}) = 0.9906 > φ1({1, 2, 4, 6}) = 0.99,
φ6({1, 6}) = 0.9906 > φ6({1, 2, 4, 6}) = 0.99, φ2({2, 4}) =
0.991 > φ2({1, 2, 4, 6}) = 0.99 and φ4({2, 4}) = 0.991 >
φ4({1, 2, 4, 6} = 0.99) (this small advantage from splitting
increases as SU 1 moves further). As SU 1 distances itself
further from the PU, its utility and that of its partner SU 6
decrease. Subsequently, as SU 1 moves 1.4 km it finds it
beneficial to split from {1, 6} and merge with SU 7. Through
this merge, SU 1 and SU 7 improve their utilities. Meanwhile,
SU 6 rejoins SUs {2, 4} forming a 3-SU coalition {2, 4, 6}
while increasing the utilities of all three SUs. In a nutshell,
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this figure illustrates how adaptive coalition formation through
merge and split operates in a mobile cognitive radio network.
Similar results can be seen whenever all SUs are mobile or
even the PU is mobile but they are omitted for space limitation.
Finally, in Fig. 7, for a network of N = 30 SUs, we
evaluate the sizes of the coalitions resulting from our dis-
tributed algorithm and compare them with the the upper bound
Mmax derived in Theorem 1. First and foremost, as the non-
cooperative Pf increases, both the maximum and the average
size of the formed coalitions decrease converging towards the
non-cooperative case as Pf reaches the constraint α = 0.1.
Through this result, we can clearly see the limitations that the
detection-false alarm probabilities trade off for collaborative
sensing imposes on the coalition size and network topology.
Moreover, in this figure, we show that, albeit the upper bound
on coalition size Mmax increases drastically as Pf becomes
smaller, the average maximum coalition size achieved by the
proposed algorithm does not exceed 4 SUs per coalition for the
given network with N = 30. This result shows that, in general,
the network topology is composed of a large number of small
coalitions rather than a small number of large coalitions, even
when Pf is small and the collaboration possibilities are large.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a novel distributed algorithm
for collaborative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio network.
We modeled the collaborative sensing problem as a coalitional
game with non-transferable utility and we derived a distributed
algorithm for coalition formation. The proposed coalition
formation algorithm is based on two simple rules of merge-
and-split that enable SUs in a cognitive network to cooperate
for improving their detection probability while taking into
account the cost in terms of false alarm probability. We char-
acterized the network structure resulting from the proposed
algorithm, studied its stability and showed that a maximum
number of SUs per coalition exists for the proposed utility
model. Simulation results showed that the proposed distributed
algorithm reduces the average missing probability per SU up
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Fig. 7. Maximum and average coalition size vs. non-cooperative false alarm
Pf (or energy detection threshold) for the distributed solution.
to 86.54% compared to the non-cooperative case. The results
also show how, through the proposed algorithm, the SUs can
autonomously adapt the network structure to environmental
changes such as mobility. Finally, through simulations we
compared the performance of the proposed algorithm with that
of an optimal centralized solution.
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